

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
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R 060927Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3935
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 2146

USCINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE KU SA PLO
SUBJ: SITUATION IN LEBANON: KUWAITI AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS ON
IMPLEMENTATION CAIRO ACCORD

1. KUWAITI AMBASSADOR ABDUL HAMID AL-BUAYJAN, DURING COURTESY
CALL MAY 5, GAVE ME FOLLOWING RUNDOWN OF HIS EFFORTS AND THOSE OF
SAUDI AMBASSADOR TO FIND WAY OUT OF PRESENT IMPASSE ON IMPLEMEN-
TATION CAIRO ACCORD FOR DISARMING THE FACTIONS IN LEBANON. HE
SAID THAT HE HAD GONE TO KUWAIT TO DISCUSS HOW HIS GOVERNMENT AND
PALESTINIANS COULD FIND COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO PROBLEM POSED BY
PRESIDENT SARKIS'S INSISTENCE THAT NUMBER ARMED MEN IN CAMPS BE
HELD AT 7 PER THOUSAND. (HE EXPLAINED THAT 7 PER THOUSAND FIGURE
CAME FROM FACT THAT THIS WAS RATIO OF POLICE TO CIVILIANS IN
THE REST OF LEBANON.)

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2. HE HAD COME BACK WITH PROPOSAL THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT
FIGURE OF 7 PER THOUSAND PROVIDED IT BE BROKEN DOWN INTO TWO
CATEGORIES: 3 PER THOUSAND TO BE THE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND FORCES
WHO WOULD BE THE CAMP POLICE, AND 4 PER THOUSAND TO BE LIGHTLY
ARMED MILITIA WHOSE SUBMACHINE GUNS AND SIMILAR WEAPONS WOULD BE
KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY IN DEPOTS SUPERVISED BY PALESTINIANS AND
LEBANESE WITHIN CAMP. PALESTINIANS WOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE TO

REMOVE ALL HEAVY ARMS FROM CAMPS. THEY HAD MAINTAINED THIS WAS AS FAR AS THEY COULD GO BECAUSE THEY HAD TO MAINTAIN PROTECTION FROM ATTACK EITHER FROM ISRAELIS OR CHRISTIANS. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT IF PALESTINIANS WERE DISARMED, CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO DO SAME. SARKIS HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS, SAYING THAT FIGURE OF 7 LIGHTLY ARMED POLICE WAS ALL HE COULD ACCEPT AND THAT, HAVING TAKEN DECISION THAT 7 WAS APPROPRIATE NUMBER, HE WOULD NOT RETRACT IT.

3. AT THIS POINT KUWAITI AMBASSADOR HAD SAID HE HAD DONE HIS BEST AND HIS CONSCIENCE WAS CLEAR, AND HE WENT INTO HOSPITAL FOR MINOR OPERATION. IN MEANTIME, SAUDI AMBASSADOR ALI AL-SHAER PICKED UP THE BALL AND WORKED OUT WITH PALESTINIANS ANOTHER PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD BE AGREEMENT ON FIGURE OF 3 PER THOUSAND LIGHTLY ARMED POLICE PLUS A "SMALL MILITIA," NUMBERS OF WHICH WOULD NOT BE STATED. PALESTINIANS WERE UNWILLING TO GIVE EXACT NUMBER BECAUSE THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE VALUABLE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO WOULD-BE ATTACKER. (IT NOT CLEAR WHY, IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT KUWAITI FORMULA DESCRIBED ABOVE.) SARKIS HAD ALSO TURNED DOWN THIS FORMULA AND WAS STILL INSISTING ON THE MAGIC 7. BUAYJAN THOUGHT HE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO GO BACK TO KUWAITI PROPOSAL.

4. BUAYJAN SAID SARKIS HAD WANTED THE MEMBERS OF THE QUADRIPARTITE COMMISSION TO SIGN LEBANESE INTERPRETATION OF CAIRO ACCORD. PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN PARTY TO CAIRO ACCORD, HOWEVER, AND IT WAS NOT FUNCTION OF QUADRIPARTITE COMMISSION NOW TO LEGISLATE WHAT ITS INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE. RATHER, THE INTERPRETATION WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREED TO BY THEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORD AGAINST PALESTINIAN WILL WAS IMPOSSIBLE. IF THE SYRIANS ATTEMPTED TO IMPLEMENT LEBANESE INTERPRETATION BY FORCE, THERE WOULD BE A GREAT MANY CASUALTIES, AND HE DID NOT THINK IN THE END THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO PULL IT OFF. HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SYRIANS TO TAKE THE BEIRUT CAMPS. PALESTINIANS WERE VERY WELL ARMED, VERY WELL TRAINED, AND VERY DETERMINED. I COMMENTED THAT THE FIGHTING AT TARIQ AL JADIDAH LAST WEEK HAD SHOWN THAT.

5. COMMENT: BUAYJAN'S DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION IS ENCOURAGING TO EXTENT IT INDICATES PALESTINIAN INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CAIRO ACCORD. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WRONG TO COUNT ON IT, IT SEEMS AS THOUGH SOME FLEXIBILITY BY SARKIS ON QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF ARMED MEN IN THE CAMPS MIGHT LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF CRISIS. I HOPE TO SEE SARKIS NEXT WEEK AND WILL TRY TO RAISE THIS WITH HIM AT THAT TIME.
PARKER

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Message Attributes

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